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What explains the differences in the Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation? Overall, I suggest, the 
several trajectories are explained by the dissimilarities of oil and gas as commodities and potential 
foreign policy tools. These differences, along with other factors, such as corporate culture and 
individual personalities, shed light on the strategies of Russia’s gas conglomerates, Gazprom and 
Rosneft. Yet, if a more nuanced understanding of variation within these energy markets illuminates the 
reasons behind the sequencing of oil and gas cross-border pipeline projects, what explains the particular 
timing of the landmark 2014 gas deal? Why after 15 years of stalemate in the Sino-Russian gas 
cooperation did breakthroughs occur in 2014? And what explains the modesty of the record in gas 
cooperation to date? Many factors are undoubtedly involved, both economic and political; however, I 
contend that the conclusive factor can be found in underlying domestic politics. 
The article outlines the role of national narratives in driving both Russia and China’s energy foreign 
policy and goes on to argue that the Sino-Russian gas breakthrough in 2014 was due to the peculiar way 






There are a variety of domestic and external factors, as well as economic and geostrategic reasons that 
have boosted China-Russian energy cooperation in 2014. This fairly remarkable development, 
unimaginable only a short time ago, I contend, codifies shifting identity patterns in Eurasia. In terms of 
forging an energy partnership, China and Russia have long appeared to be a perfect match. However, it 
was only in 2014 that the China-Russia energy relationship reached the level of development that their 
geographical proximity and economic complementarity had long implied. As China’s economy 
boomed, its demand for natural resources became a major factor in the regional and global economy.  
Due to these commercial developments in place before the Ukraine crisis, Moscow’s strategic 
posture had long stressed the need to “Look East.” Russia’s general turn to China had to do with 
Moscow’s assessment that Asia, and China in particular, would be the major source of future economic 
growth. (Kokoshin 2011). Yet it was only in 2014 that Russia and China signed a megadeal in gas. In 
the aftermath of this deal, many scholars speculated whether a partnership which would transcend 
simple commerce would develop (Paik 2015; Røseth 2017). While the “energy alliance” designation 
(Wang 2016) hardly describes the character of Sino-Russian relations, the year 2014 certainly marked 
a historic moment in the two countries’ cooperation in natural gas. To explain the raise of momentum 
leading to the 2014 breakthrough, this article argues that Sino-Russian energy interdependence is 
affected by the domestic context in which the economic relationship takes place, the energy companies 
in each country, and the personalities of crucial actors. The nexus between domestic conditions and 
foreign policy had been a major feature of the years leading to the historic 2014 gas deal. This very 
nexus was married to the personalities of leaders in power at that particular time. Individuals are key to 
decision-making in all regimes, authoritarian and democratic alike. The primacy of personalities in 
shaping and even upending policy outcomes is the most striking feature of present-day Russia and China 
(Lo 2015, 11; Easter 2008). 
Moreover, in recent years, there has been much discussion of “narrative” as an essential prerequisite 
of a successful strategy, a storyline that not only provides a justification for particular actions but also 
creates expectations for the future and thusly helps others, friends as well as opponents, to adapt to a 
new situation (Freedman 2014, 30). To date, however, the ways that such “national narratives” have 
mediated the Sino-Russian energy relationship have not been addressed in necessary depth. Through 
an examination of Sino-Russian energy deals, this article promises to contribute to a discussion of these 
major themes: an illustration of the links between domestic political conditions and foreign policy; an 
explication that personalities matter both in foreign policy and corporate culture; and an examination 
of how energy companies drive outcomes in energy policy. 
The article also provides an assessment of factors of change in global gas markets. The point at issue 
is a major redefinition of energy interdependencies: oil markets have long been international and gas 
markets are only just now becoming so. Some national oil companies (NOC) go international and 
rapidly adapt to the challenges of globalization (i.e. Rosneft), others struggle to do so. The growing 
globalization of gas trade, the strong rise in the use of renewables, and changes in modes of energy 
production and trade in the “shale revolution” age have caused spillovers into the realm of the Russia-
China energy partnership; this, in turn, enhances China’s leverage in an already imbalanced bilateral 
relationship. These unexpected turns of events as seen from the perspective of Gazprom, strongly 
affected its market position in Europe. Among the unforeseen circumstances, the unconventional 
revolution has been the one that left Gazprom inevitably weakened and ultimately changed its strategic 
calculus in Eurasian gas geopolitics.1 
The concluding section summarizes the results and follows with a discussion of the importance of 
these findings for both policymakers and future research. 
 
Oil and Gas as Explanatory Factors 
 
Sino-Russian gas cooperation differs in important ways from cooperation in oil. This has to do with the 
inherent differences between gas and oil as commodities and as potential foreign policy tools. Oil is 
difficult to produce but is a lucrative international business. Unlike oil, gas is comparatively easy to 
produce but difficult and expensive to transport. Considering that the value of what is being transported 
is much lower, the sunk costs of building gas pipelines are higher. In natural gas, Russia’s eastern 
regions export infrastructure is still insufficient to make use of the country’s hitherto largely 
underdeveloped resources (Gustafson 2012, 58; Itoh 2017). Moreover, gas pipelines, much more so 
than oil pipelines, create rigid relationships between suppliers and customers, making buyers potentially 
vulnerable to the geopolitical calculations of producers on the other end of the pipeline (Casier 2011, 
542). Despite growing ties in gas markets, gas trade is still overwhelmingly regional and pipeline gas 
trade creates “umbilical cords” that are hard to break. Given the notorious history of distrust between 
Russia and China, many twists and turns intervened before the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline actually 
turned out to be a viable option, while oil cooperation began earlier, in 2009. In light of important trust-
related setbacks in natural gas, rationalist approaches that seek to explain the Sino-Russian gas trade by 
focusing exclusively on interests (i.e. price disagreements) are incomplete and should be supplemented 
by normative factors (Ziegler 2013). 
This article agrees with conventional wisdom, which states that the general trajectory of Sino-
Russian energy relations is well explained by an emphasis on firms’ commercial interests.2 Oil is a more 
lucrative international business. And hence, unsurprisingly, there was more urgency in launching oil 
cooperation, which explains the sequencing of oil first and gas second in Sino-Russian energy projects. 
This, in turn, sheds light on the differing strategies of Gazprom and Rosneft in maximizing revenues 
and profits, both at home and overseas. Yet just as with oil trade, objective commercial interests had 
been pushing in the direction of gas cooperation since the early 1990s. A breakthrough, however, 
occurred only in 2014. While the differences in oil and gas can illuminate the reasons why oil 
cooperation – a lucrative international business – occurred first, this differentiation alone tells us 
nothing about why 2014 happened to be the year for a breakthrough in gas. This article argues that to 
understand the timing of the natural gas deal we have to look at other factors – namely changed 
incentives at the domestic level that affected the context of negotiation. 
In the next sections, I provide evidence to illustrate that, when we turn our attention to the particular 
question of why now for the Sino-Russian 2014 gas deal, this article’s approach adds more value to the 
discussion than theories concerned primarily with the maximization of wealth or power. Building on 
the insight that national identities bestow economic policy with social purpose, this article proposes a 
novel analytical framework. It emphasizes change in social priorities, and thus a novel construction of 
inter-subjective meanings as expressed in domestic political discourse and social mobilization occurring 
at that time period. The argument is cast in terms of energy companies’ choices about their trade policy 
in the context of perceived interests, opportunities, incentives and constraints. The domestic-level 
concerns within which energy cooperation is, to borrow from Karl Polanyi, ‘embedded’ are remarkable, 
and their impact can cut both ways. They can push energy companies towards even closer cooperation 
or, at times, signal a departure from productive cooperation. This conceptual backdrop is important for 
the empirically grounded analysis of the nature of Gazprom and Rosneft, and the domestic landscape 
within which they operate. 
 
Gazprom vs. Rosneft 
 
Due to differing natures of the supply system and dissimilar structures of the two industries, the oil and 
gas sectors followed different trajectories in the modern economic history of Russia. The oil sector has 
been transformed into a more competitive segment of the economy after the crises of the 1990s. The 
outsized power that Rosneft enjoys in the present day derives from its acquisitions since the turn of the 
century, which, considering that the price of oil hovered at around 110$/barrel, strongly boosted its 
dividends. Prices for crude oil are linked to international markets. As a truly privatized national oil 
company (NOC), Rosneft has been economically less beholden to the Russian government than 
Gazprom.3 Moreover, given that oil money strongly contributes to the state coffers, the power of 
Rosneft, and its CEO Igor Sechin, have soared. 
The gas sector in Russia has had a completely different institutional trajectory. The government still 
maintains tight control over the gas business chain. Political control of exports remains important 
despite the lower profitability of gas as compared to oil. Acute politicization of the gas business remains 
a prominent feature of energy politics in Russia, in turn making Gazprom a very particular case of state–
market interaction (Belyi and Locatelli 2015). The political importance placed on Gazprom as the 
guarantor of gas to Russia’s domestic market at regulated-below market prices,4 coupled with 
Gazprom’s dependence on exports to a specific market, i.e. Europe, perpetuates politicization of the 
EU-Russia gas relations, something unheard of in EU-Russia oil trade. Oil companies in Russia are 
exempted from the role of a “policy tool” and therefore also free from allegations of using energy as a 
political “weapon.” 
This article’s contention is that the different paths of Sino-Russian oil and gas trade cannot be 
understood without taking into account the incentives that Russian and Chinese state leaders have to 
engage in oil vs. gas cooperation, and the way that domestic corporate actors shape those incentives. 
The argument is rooted in the view that the most important factor to look at is the commercial interest 
of energy firms. Firm-to-firm relations, however, build on past interactions and on a variety of social, 
political, and institutional contexts that “contain” their negotiations at particular historical moments. 
Since the end of the Soviet Union, Russia’s oil and gas sectors reflect opposing dynamics, the impact 
of which may drive a further reinforcement of the national oil giant, Rosneft, whereas it weakens the 
gas company Gazprom, both domestically and abroad. In gas, company-to-company interactions are 
rarely independent from the government (Belyi and Talus 2015). They are supported by the state 
especially for deals that carry geopolitical value along with economic relevance. In that sense, the 
Gazprom-CNPC landmark gas pipeline illustrates the extraordinary complexity of the international 
political economy (IPE) of natural gas. 
Although the share of non-Gazprom gas production has been growing and independent companies 
such as Novatek play increasingly important roles in Russia, Gazprom remains an important tool of 
Russia’s energy diplomacy.5 At the same time, the scale of innovation of energy markets does place 
new limits on energy firms’ “state strategies.” An important academic debate is taking place on the 
growing interdependencies and the parallel restriction of national policies not only in oil, but in gas 
policy, too. As a major source of government revenues, the energy sector plays a crucial role in Russia’s 
economy. Strong dependence on exports makes Russia extremely vulnerable to strategic shocks such 
as the unconventional revolution and large oil price fluctuations. As recently as 2015, the oil and gas 
sectors accounted for 43% of the government budget and 53% of total exports (Itoh 2017). 
The preceding discussion has shown that, because of its inherent characteristics, oil creates 
interdependence but not vulnerability (Baldwin 1980; Keohane and Nye 1977 [2011]).6 This 
observation is at odds with the realist position in the literature on interdependence and conflict, which 
still sees oil as a strategic weapon used to exercise power (Krasner 1974; Hess 2003, 154; Glaser 2013). 
If in the past this was true for gas, it is basically no longer the case. This changing IPE of energy consists 
of actors at various levels (Belyi and Talus 2015, 3; Skalamera 2016). These include states, energy 
companies and supranational institutions, such as the EU. 
The impact of unforeseen challenges in the energy landscape has its most evident manifestation in 
the ways energy firms react to them. Energy firms are thus the real drivers (or the lack of thereof) of 
Sino-Russian energy cooperation and, at the same time, the main actors coping with this increased 
asymmetry in an already unequal energy partnership. While an overly high decentralization of the oil 
sector stimulated a competitive centralization of Rosneft, an over-centralization of the Gazprom 
business led to its weakening (Belyi and Locatelli 2015). A second, related, point suggests that Gazprom 
and Rosneft have had varied degrees of success in their cooperation with China due to the inherent 
differences of oil and gas in shaping larger firm-to-firm interactions – and these companies’ peculiar 
relationships with the state. Energy firms, indeed, do not operate in a vacuum. This article suggests that 
domestic events and, occasionally, a reformed sense of national purpose, (Laruelle 2008; Tsygankov 
2016, 17) strongly affect corporate strategies. 
The following case studies uncover the interplay of international influences and domestic 
circumstances in Sino-Russian energy trade. A focus on changing domestic narratives, in addition to 
prevailing economic factors illuminates the timing of the Sino-Russian 2014 gas breakthrough, which 
is difficult to explain from the standpoint of rationalist theoretical approaches. 
 
Data and Method 
 
This article presents new results using primary data assembled through extensive interviews in the 
countries under examination. The analysis also draws on news reports and existing literature on the 
cases. Due to the nature of the question tackled and the available data, the case-study method was 
chosen to reveal how particular variables affect outcomes.7 While quantitative research can show 
correlation between a set of factors, it cannot say what causal role a particular factor played leading to 
a given outcome and with what degree of salience. 
An in-depth case-study method is most useful when one has access to interviews with elites that 
reveal the inner decision-making process of the actors in question. Process tracing was used as an 
analytical tool to examine the case studies and establish the presence of different variables and the 
relationship between them.8 The choice of this method might lead to worries of selection bias and lack 
of generalizability9 — in that respect, empirical results across two robust case studies show that the 
salience of commercial interests of energy firms paired with individual personalities and historical 
domestic factors is paramount for energy policy change. Political history, institutional legacies, local 
cultures, worldviews, and other “structural” features account for a high degree of salience predicting 
either the onset or the nature of the outcome of broader energy trade deals. This data prompted a new 
line of reasoning and offered a way to link the emphasis, common to rationalist theories, on maximizing 
wealth or power (in Sino-Russian energy commerce) with identity politics’ emphasis on furthering 
status or restoring dignity. Such an approach is better versed to explain massive yet unanticipated shifts 
in global politics. 
There has been much scholarly work on the economic and strategic benefits of the recent Sino-
Russian energy deals. The case studies in this article, in covering two important developments of the 
Sino-Russian energy trade, suggest an alternative perspective highlighting the importance of 
commercial interests, which are imbued in historically specific domestic contexts. Consequently, when 
this article examines Sino-Russian energy interdependence it sheds light on a variety of national 
specificities pertaining to Russia and China and on the contestations occurring at the moment when the 
negotiation over these energy megadeals were taking place. The article seeks to further the debate on 
how domestic political dynamics interact with rationalist incentives to explain big shifts and 
occasionally surprising foreign policy outcomes.10  This approach goes beyond looking at ways in which 
domestic institutions aggregate (domestic and international) pressures, transforming them into state 
policy, which has been already widely researched by the liberal school.11 
 
Oil Cooperation – a Success Story 
 
Just as with Europe before, Russia’s current economic “pivot” to China hinges primarily on cooperation 
in oil and natural gas. Out of the two – oil cooperation has been king. Chinese and Russian officials and 
oil companies have been discussing the construction of a cross-border oil pipeline since the mid-1990s. 
In the 1990s, when world oil prices were low and the Russian oil industry was starved for capital, Russia 
was interested in selling oil to China but the Chinese were in no hurry to finalize the negotiations.12  For 
all their protestations of amity, for most of this decade China and Russia remained noticeably distrustful 
of one another and placed a high premium on preservation of as much national sovereignty as possible.13 
Nevertheless, Beijing’s thirst for oil and its reliance on maritime transit for oil import made Russia’s 
pipeline a very attractive alternative that could provide diversity both from the volatility of politics in 
the Middle East, and the risk of interruption of the shipping routes.14 Over the course of the 2000s, 
Chinese strategists became acutely concerned about the security of oil transports as they travelled across 
the Indian Ocean and through the Strait of Malacca (Cohen and Kirshner 2012, 157). These analysts 
(Shi Hongtao 2004; Liu Xiaoli 2009) worried that the United States might impose a blockade in the 
event of a crisis.15 
The initial plan was for a pipeline from Angarsk in East Siberia to Daqing in north-eastern China 
but Moscow became increasingly concerned about building a pipeline to a single customer with strong 
monopsony power (i.e. China), and about the involvement of a private oil company—Yukos – in a deal 
of such a strategic significance.16 Rosneft, Russia’s national oil company, which in the 1990s struggled 
to survive, swallowed Yukos’s assets, and emerged as an increasingly powerful national oil champion 
(Poussenkova 2013). Along with Yukos’s assets, Rosneft inherited the company’s fascination with 
China. In light of this article’s emphasis on personalities, Igor Sechin, one of the most influential 
persons in Putin’s entourage, quickly positioned himself as a privileged interlocutor with the Chinese 
energy businesses. Nevertheless, protracted negotiations over pricing and disagreements over the route 
of the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline followed the initial accord in 2001. Then the 2008 
global economic slump, the swelling debt of Russia energy companies, and declining Russian energy 
revenues due to the fall in the price of oil, once again created a gap between Russia’s aspirations and 
achievements.17 
In 2009, Russia finally began work on a spur from Skovorodino to Daqing, China, in exchange for 
Chinese loans to two Russian oil companies, Rosneft and Transneft. The $25 billion, twenty-year deal 
with Russia’s Rosneft and Transneft would yield China 15 million tons of crude oil each year. It would 
also help with realizing one of Russia’s most important geopolitical goals: increasing production of oil 
for sale in Asian markets. Under the Putin regime, this became the centrepiece of the Kremlin’s 
approach to developing Siberia and the Far East. Expanded oil production in the Far East became critical 
not only for the development of the region, but also for Russia’s ability to expand its economic and 
political weight in Asia. The Russian Far East is a gigantic and resource rich area, but is also thinly 
populated and remote from Russia’s centres of power. It has lost a quarter of its population since the 
collapse of the centralized Soviet economy and is now home to only about six million people.18 It is 
therefore a case in point of how historically and socially specific domestic contexts play important roles 
in defining broader commercial interests (Welch Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Kirshner 2015). 
Since then, oil cooperation has continued to grow in scale and profits, on pace with China’s 
insatiable growth and Russia’s interest in ensuring reliable supplies.19 Under Sechin’s watch, Rosneft 
was quickly promoted to the preeminent spot in the domestic oil industry. The preceding contingent 
generalizations about oil as a more profitable and, thus, a more “sought after” commodity than gas held 
in the long term. However, there remains an irreducible element of choice and agency to explain how 
Sechin, President Putin’s long-time associate, and his ostensible close personal relations with Chinese 
counterparts, might have helped forge the Sino-Russian oil partnership.20 Corporate decisions rarely, if 
ever, reflect “objective” commercial interests, but are made by individuals both conditioned and driven 
by their own particular cultural references, vested interests, biases, and the peculiarities of the business 
they run (Lo 2015, 5; Abdelal 2015). In early 2013, Rosneft acquired TNK-BP in a $55 billion deal, 
which added about 9 million tons of oil to the company’s production output and made Sechin the CEO 
of the world’s largest listed crude oil producer.21 In June 2013, Rosneft and CNPC inked a deal 
reportedly worth $270 billion over 25 years, with China putting itself on track to become Russia’s 
largest client of oil. In January 2014 Transneft opened its second and final branch of the ESPO pipeline, 
just in time to double its capacity from 30 million tons a year to 50 million tons, for a total supply 365m 
tonnes of oil to China over 25 years, in exchange for an additional prepayment of $30 billion to 
Rosneft.22 
While personal ties may have given Russia-China oil cooperation greater significance, geopolitical 
predicaments such as the Ukraine crisis, naturally, have taken a toll on the relationship. In late 2014 the 
plummeting value of the ruble, record levels of capital flight, and rising inflation were a direct 
consequence of external factors, above all the fall in global oil prices and the severely restricted access 
of Russian enterprises to Western credit finance (Abdelal, Skalamera and Atnashev 2016; Lo 2015). In 
the post-Ukraine world, Russia has hoped to garner China’s support and counted on Chinese credit as 
it was compelled to reduce its exposure to Western financial markets. Moscow’s expectations remained 
largely unmet. In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, Beijing had been leery of investing in Russia’s 
upstream energy sector.23 There was no fundamental reason for a Chinese private-sector rush to Russia, 
unless Russia had sold itself so cheaply that it would had become irresistible for Chinese companies 
and asset managers. They knew, however, that as long as current conditions persisted, Russia’s appetite 
for hard cash would certainly grow, and that Chinese companies would be able to buy assets at much 
cheaper prices.24 
Igor Sechin’s skillful manoeuvring with Chinese partners in the past has translated into the company 
extracting tens of billions from CNPC to pay off debts. Amid frustration over the post-Ukraine slow 
progress with equity deals, Sechin successfully used Indian partners as a counterbalance to irritate 
CNPC — in 2016, Rosneft sold a 15% stake of Vankorneft, a Rosneft subsidiary, to ONGC, an Indian 
company (Henderson and Mitrova 2016). It seemed that the move had worked well to stunt momentum 
in deepening oil trade between China and Russia. After the Indian deal, China’s Beijing Gas Group 
bought 20 per cent of a Russian equity field run by Rosneft for 
$1.1bn, in a deal that also gives the Russian oil conglomerate access to the Chinese domestic gas 
market.25 
Energy interdependence between China and Russia makes energy companies (i.e. Rosneft) into a 
particular influential interest group that almost invariably wants smooth trade and is averse to conflict 
(Abdelal 2015, 7; Kirshner, 2007). From Russia’s perspective, the fallout with the West accelerated a 
turn to the east but it has also made such a move harder to accomplish. After all, amidst the current 
order China has benefited more than anyone, and there had been no reason to seek substantial 
adjustments. In fact, in light of Russia’s weakness and China’s own economic slowdown,26 CNPC’s 
continued urgency to deepen corporate ties with Rosneft deserves attention. 
An emphasis on a rationalist interest-based argument, which at the same time ignores intimate ties 
at the firm-to-firm level, has a difficult time explaining China’s behaviour. In light of the Ukraine crisis, 
China has been understandably reluctant to wade into Russia’s financial markets and, in turn, jeopardize 
its relationship with the West.27 Nevertheless, its continued commitment to Rosneft means that CNPC 
is concerned with protecting its high-profile corporate link to Sechin’s firm.28 In September 2017, the 
energy bond between Russia and China was once again deepened by Rosneft. After a protracted lack 
of concrete deals CEFC China Energy spent $9.1 bn for a 14.16 per cent stake in Rosneft. At the signing 
ceremony, Igor Sechin said he was “happy that it was specifically a Chinese corporation” that had 
bought a stake.29 The deal will give CEFC access to oilfields in eastern Russia close to the Chinese 
border and is the first time a Chinese company has taken a stake in one of the most important businesses 
controlled by the Kremlin. Some commentators argue that while in the past it has been much more 
difficult to invest in those of Russia’s oil fields considered to be of “strategic importance,” Russia’s 
current desperate need for foreign investments catalysed the agreement and, ultimately, signalled 
Rosneft’s vigorous “turn to the East.”30 Be that as it may, the historically specific social context (i.e. 
Sechin’s firm-to-firm intimate connection with the Chinese), certainly defined the bargaining and 
played a great role in propelling both sides towards the agreement. China’s resourcefulness, displayed 
in its ability to reform old practices in order to take advantage of the situation, has been matched by the 
notable display of agility on Russia’s part in adapting to the disagreeable, but fiscally indispensable, 
new rapport de forces. Such personal relationships are, however, almost completely absent from the 
scholarly literature on comparative and international political economy. We lack integrated 
understandings of both (material) international influences and normative aspects that might explain the 
contours of processes of foreign policy formation and change, and the ways energy firms interact to 
produce such mixed outcomes. Personal corporate relationships, once kindled, are difficult to undo. 
One of the central factors that has propelled the Sino-Russian partnership in oil is the enthusiasm that 
Rosneft’s Sechin has put into cultivating personal relationships with major energy players in China. 
According to Gabuev (2016), after the Ukraine crisis China’s corporate players were encouraged to 
actively seek new opportunities in Russia but to avoid overtly exploiting Russia’s difficult situation or 
seeking one-sided deals at knockdown prices. The leadership in Beijing worried that oversized appetites 
and the aggressiveness of Chinese investors would contribute to undesirable tensions and eventually 
encourage Russia to make a U-turn to mend relations with the West, which is why Xi personally blessed 
the giant Power of Siberia gas pipeline and intended it as a gesture of goodwill to the Kremlin. This 
instance highlights the nexus of foreign (energy) policy and domestic politics in Eurasia, and shows 
how economic developments not only shape but also are shaped by domestic concerns, such as history, 
identity, culture, and events. The eagerness of Sechin to forge close ties with Chinese corporate partners 
or the personal chemistry between Putin and Xi are factors that matter. IPE approaches focusing purely 
on firms’ profit, however, often black box important agents and such path-dependent practices (Sharples 
2016, 4). In this sense, material facts are important, but national identities, and the historical memories 
embedded in them, give meaning to material facts so that energy companies can interpret and react to 
them (Abdelal 2001, 38). It is in this context that Sino-Russian oil trade has significantly deepened in 
recent years, whereas gas cooperation is just now slowly emerging. It is to this cooperation that I now 
turn. 
 
Gas Cooperation and the Uneasy Birth of the Power of Siberia 
 
After more than a decade of haggling, on 21 May 2014, China and Russia signed a historic agreement 
for China to import natural gas from Russia’s Gazprom. The agreement, signed during a state visit by 
President Vladimir Putin in Beijing, consisted of a 30-year, $400 billion gas deal for the delivery of 38 
billion cubic meters of natural gas to China beginning in 2018. 
The decades-long insufficient political will toward cooperation in gas on both Gazprom’s and 
CNPC’s side was by no means an accident. As shown above, Sino-Russian oil interdependence has 
continued to deepen and was bound to come about in the natural gas sector, too. Russia knew that the 
centre of gravity in the global energy market had shifted to Asia, predominantly led by surging demand 
from China and India. China, in particular, represented an enormous and fast expanding gas market.31 
By contrast, energy demand in Europe, traditionally the main destination for Russia’s exports, was 
projected to decrease.32 
However, there were several reasons for the delay in gas cooperation: for one, price differences that 
pushed back the gas deal a full decade. Historically, CNPC has insisted that Gazprom sell natural gas 
to China at a price that is competitive with China’s low domestic coal prices, while Gazprom wanted 
CNPC to pay natural gas prices that are tied to oil prices, like its customers in Europe do.33 Another 
question at issue was the preferred route: Gazprom wanted to ship gas from existing gas fields in 
Western Siberia to China’s restive Xinjiang region; China long insisted that it needed energy in the 
populous coastal provinces of the east. With Moscow reluctant to accept China’s terms, little real 
progress has been made on adding the gas element to the landmark deals in oil. One driver of Russia’s 
stumbling pattern had been a domestic political dilemma: on the one hand there was resistance to 
“putting all Russia’s eggs in the Chinese basket,”34 especially in terms of the strategic importance of 
natural gas as a preeminent Russian foreign policy tool. On the other, there were increasing domestic 
demands that Russia open up to China to invigorate economic growth. Worries about “strategic 
independence” in Asia prevailed and made Gazprom wait too long, only to realize in 2014, in extremis, 
that the longer it waited the worse deal it was ultimately going to receive. Gazprom, the dominant player 
in this process, has never been a strong proponent of increased ties with China along the lines of 
Rosneft’s model of oil cooperation. It has, instead, ensured that any decisions concerning expansion to 
the east would be made with an eye to the geopolitical implications for Gazprom’s business in Europe.35 
Whereas Rosneft’s Sechin, who had the prescience to see the coming shift to Asia, is considered a savvy 
business-man and even as a primary defender of Russia’s new raison d’état, Gazprom’s Miller had been 
slow to take advantage of this shift and his reputation has not been similarly enhanced. Easy money in 
Europe made Gazprom rich and slow to reform. This fixation with Europe has led some experts argue 
that Gazprom had been a liability for Russia’s gas pivot to China.36 Even though China and Russia 
featured prominently in each other’s energy trade diversification strategies, their conflicting 
perspectives in gas pointed to a more general problem of mistrust. 
This article argues that the landmark gas deal happened thanks to an evolution in individual 
corporate actors’ attitudes and national narratives at the domestic level, paired with a changed 
international context, a development that has been largely overlooked by the dominant rationalist 
theoretical approaches. The domestic context here coexists with the erratic impact of “strategic shocks.” 
Gazprom’s being torn between a new export strategy towards the Asian-Pacific and a focus on Europe 
demonstrates both the strength of path-dependent practices and of unexpected external shocks in the 
gas business. Short of being compelled by its own devastating “existential crisis” following the shale 
gas revolution it is very unlikely that Gazprom would have decided to vigorously “pivot” East and ink 
the landmark deal, at this particular moment. 
Gas, as I noted, is more “risky” than oil and more difficult to replenish in response to arbitrary 
interruptions of supply, such as those that occurred in the winters of 2006 and 2009 as a result of 
disputes between Moscow and Kyiv (Kropatcheva 2011, 559; Stulberg 2015). This explains why there 
were so many twist and turns before gas cooperation finally became a viable option for China.37 But 
were the differences in oil and gas—and the differences in their prices—as central to determining the 
course of political developments that ultimately led to the gas breakthrough in 2014? 
The surveyed evidence is consistent with the claim that such differences explain the sequencing of 
Sino-Russian joint energy projects. Arguments that may seem foolproof, nevertheless, deserve scrutiny. 
Are these differences sufficient to account for the particular timing of the gas deal? The answer, it 
seems: only in part. In fact, there were other, additional powerful drivers in place to bridge the price 
gap. The big shift came as a fortuitous conjunction of two parallel circumstances: in 2013 Russia’s 
long-standing business model in Europe started to crumble, and at that precise time, China, under the 
effect of disruptive air pollution, needed additional gas as a greener fossil fuel. In this instance, the 
inherent differences in oil and gas had only a minor influence on the choice of the particular time when 
the deal was clinched. 
In the case of Russia, developments in Europe had a major bearing on its “security of demand.” 
Long before events in Ukraine, Russia’s slumping economic fortunes in Europe were induced by a trio 
of developments in Brussels: an emphasis on renewables and energy efficiency; efforts to reduce 
European energy dependence on Russia through diversification (Romanova 2016, 10); and a prolonged 
economic recession that pushed demand down (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011). It was mainly the EU’s 
antitrust cases against Gazprom married to European attempts to wean itself off fuel supplies from 
Russia that filled Gazprom with indignation,38 and so, inaugurated its new preferred narrative: the 
Power of Siberia pipeline demonstrates Russia’s ability to develop new export markets outside of 
Europe and is just the start of a key strategic bond between Russia and China, evocative of the gas-for-
pipes agreement with West Germany (Trenin 2015). The more difficult task had been ensuring broad 
backing of this new national narrative about “who Russia is in opposition to the West” by elites across 
the ideological spectrum. Moscow now insisted on its own distinctive civilization (rejecting the 
“universal values” of the West), a civilization that is shared through “Eurasia” and that with China has 
in common a distant Mongol legacy (Weigandt and Katzenstein 2017). Arrangements for gas trade 
directed exclusively westward were thus unmade by politics in 2013–2014 and rendered illegitimate by 
a transformation in political discourse at the domestic level.39 The West took actions that indicated 
indifference to Russia’s status concerns (Krickovic and Weber 2016). This contributed to an altered 
perception of the West and strengthened the influence of the Eurasianists in the Russian political 
establishment (Tsygankov 2007, 381; Szostek 2017). Recent research into Russian foreign policy has 
noted the increasing importance placed on traditional values, prestige, and status, in which position and 
reputation form a critical component of diplomacy (Lo 2015; Mankoff 2015). 
Faltering gas interdependence with Europe went hand-in-hand with a rehashed domestic political 
landscape, thereby empowering those segments of society whose interests were served by a hawkish, 
anti-Western policy that “looked East.” Russia’s “Eurasianist”40 politicians now had a pretext to include 
the “China card” in their domestic political thinking. Unsurprisingly, the “turn to the East” (povorot na 
Vostok) greatly intensified in 2014, in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis and deteriorating relations 
with the West. These agents’ (Eurasianists) new interpretation of the preexistent material incentives 
amid no change in Russia’s economic capabilities, moderated the future course of action. Gazprom’s 
commercial interests, when outfitted with a narrative intended to coincide with the evolving national 
discourse of Putin’s Russia, produced a consequential geopolitical shift, the 2014 gas deal with China. 
Changes in EU-Russia firm-to-firm relations – certainly a compelling social, not natural, construct 
– have powerfully influenced Gazprom’s reevaluation of its business opportunities with China. Amid 
all this, Russia’s economic capabilities did not improve. The country’s economic decline continued and 
there was hardly any material basis for developing a more assertive foreign policy vis-à-vis the West. 
What changed, however, were Russian elites’ choices based on subjective interpretations of 
vulnerability vis-à-vis the West that affected self-interested behaviour in the East. Big shifts occur when 
the domestic (i.e. national preference) context for foreign policy is fundamentally altered. It is within 
the parameters of such a system that Gazprom’s much delayed “turn to the East” happened. 
At the same time, Beijing gradually shifted towards a more proactive stance concerning gas 
cooperation with Russia due to its own domestic environmental concerns, consistent with the 
overarching attempt to position itself as a “responsible ecologic power” (Skalamera 2016). China was 
far too dependent on burning dirty coal, and it needed to incorporate much cleaner natural gas to 
alleviate already alarming environmental problems.41 A final component of China’s opening to Russia 
was due to the security of trade routes. As Beijing’s share of imported, sea lanes-reliant gas soared, 
growing concerns about transportation security arose from the geography of the Strait of Malacca, a 
narrow waterway surrounded by Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia (America’s closest Asian allies), 
controlled by the US Navy and plagued by piracy. In the early 2010s, Obama’s policy of rebalancing 
to Asia, which China perceived as a broad-based effort to contain Beijing in the Asian-Pacific 
(Blanchard and Flint 2017, 234), only strengthened China’s concerns about reliance on these Straits 
(Shambaugh 2013, 289). Around the time of the Sino-Russian bargaining in gas, discussion of these 
issues in the context of China’s threats to domestic stability increased their importance (Fravel 2012, 
206). 
This article argues that China’s behaviour is due to a distinctive transformation in the policy 
discourse at a domestic level. It is unwise to assume that the geopolitical concern over the “Malacca 
Dilemma” by itself adequately explains the timing of China’s turn to Russia. This concern has existed 
for some time but was now being renegotiated by a changed circumstance: Xi’s agency and the act of 
“opening to Russia.”42 Altered circumstances within China – the gradual ideational orientation towards 
greener sources of energy and a heightened perception of the “Malacca Dilemma” have been the 
preeminent driver. Russia began to be regarded as a privileged partner in solving both headaches. In 
that sense, the argument fuses the liberal insight, which finds that commercial ties can give actors a 
large material incentive to forge cooperation, with the constructivist insight that there is a national 
preference affecting economic (i.e. energy) choices based on subjective interpretations of vulnerability 
(i.e. the Malacca Dilemma). 
The crucial question is not to establish whether in China price-based (commercial) considerations 
prevailed over identity-driven considerations or, alternately, whether domestic identities and norms 
prevailed over putatively material interests. In providing evidence for the argument that national 
narratives shape how political actors define their interests, this article presents a more convincing 
explanation for the timing of big shifts in foreign policy, such as the Sino-Russian gas breakthrough. In 
China, just like in Russia, one set of social constructions replaced the other. The imperative of economic 
growth was being complemented by concern for the environment,43 which was gaining ground as a 
large social issue.44 The 2014 landmark gas deal is, thus, due to a deep transformation in the national 
identities of both countries on the eve of the Sino-Russian gas deal, which affected the foreign policy 
decisions they made. None of this was inevitable or inexorable. In fact, we would know relatively little 
if we only considered the purely systemic forces of this transformation. 
Meanwhile, shifts in policy practices do not stem only from changes in national narratives, but are 
buffeted by unforeseen events at critical moments, such as the year 2014. First, the economic crisis in 
Europe and the EU’s serious move towards renewables meant that Gazprom’s traditional and most 
lucrative market was slipping away. Second, the impact of the U.S. shale gas revolution, leading to a 
supply glut in the international LNG market. Third, new natural gas infrastructure such as 
interconnectors, better storage facilities and new LNG import terminals have made the global gas 
market more interconnected and, as for Europeans, potentially less dependent on Russian gas supplies. 
These crises pushed Gazprom to pivot to China but those very woes in Europe were making it harder 
for Russia to conclude new accords with China on anything approaching favourable terms. Beijing 
knew that it could drive hard bargains with a Russia desperate for cash, credit, and new markets. During 
the years when Gazprom haggled CNPC financed and built a 30-bcm pipeline from Central Asia to 
service its Western provinces,45 it constructed a handful of LNG terminals and was also contemplating 
the development of its own shale gas reserves, which, on paper, are among the world’s largest 
(Wilhelmsen and Flikke 2011, 890). CNPC, in other words had already contracted sufficient gas imports 
to successfully diversify its supply needs and was in no particular hurry to purchase piped gas from 
Russia. It would have done so if Russia was willing to sell itself cheaply, or, under extraordinary 
circumstances, to show a degree of political goodwill for a “friend” in need. The May 2014 outcome 
was the Power of Siberia pipeline and the concurrent circumstance was Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
 
The Situation after Ukraine 
 
Having established a gas relationship with China in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis is perceived as 
a major success by Moscow. Some commentators argue that Gazprom had to settle for a lower price 
than it had hoped, but it still managed to strike the deal before the oil price, to which the gas price is 
tied, collapsed (Trenin 2015, 7; Gabuev 2016). Other analysts have put an emphasis on how the deal is 
far from being commercial from Moscow’s perspective and simply amounts to a disastrous money-
losing project.46 A third group of commentators noted that it was the profit made by some insiders close 
to the Kremlin that was most consequential. Some individuals did benefit, so the deal was “commercial” 
for several well-placed insiders (Gabuev 2016; Zaslavskiy 2014). 
The pertinent question here is not whether Russia got a good deal, given that Russia most certainly 
had to sell itself cheap. While this article recognizes the overriding importance of the firms’ profit 
considerations, it seeks to draw attention to domestic factors such as identity and internal social 
contestations in energy trade negotiation. A company’s conduct of international trade reflects profit 
considerations that are, however, embedded in corporate culture and a domestic systems of values. The 
material interests leading to the May 2014 deal, the most important of which is the agreement on the 
final price, do not, by themselves, explain why the time was ripe at that moment. This paper argues that 
the logic of energy interdependence (between the EU-Russia, and also, Russia-China) makes energy 
companies a particular influential group. Yet salient unit-level factors that operate largely in 
combination with economic forces both propel, and occasionally hinder the main actors (i.e. firms) and 
their supporters (i.e. national governments) from cooperation. In this view, what matters is how 
identities and norms influence the ways in which actors define their interests in the first place (Abdelal 
2001, 19). 
Favourable economic conditions for the May gas predated the Ukraine crisis. However, this 
geopolitical development boosted Russia’s turn East and signalled a willingness to accommodate 
Beijing’s priorities in a more substantial way. Then another unexpected shock, the fall in world oil 
prices starting in June 2014, turned the tables even more in China’s favour. This last shock has been the 
most devastating for Moscow as of yet. The reasons why may be driven by the changing preferences of 
consumers worldwide, who tend to favour “green” energy, and technological innovations that are 
bringing the price of renewables down. Even after OPEC’s frantic supply cuts in the spring of 2017, 
these cuts have not been enough to re-absorb the world’s excess supply and oil prices are not likely to 
rebound to previous levels. Energy transition and climate change policies worldwide may therefore 
have serious geopolitical effects on the Sino-Russian energy relationship.47 All this is very bad news 
for Russia; a future rise in world oil prices would, ideally, shift the balance of power from China to 
Russia. It is during seller’s market periods that producers (i.e. Russia) take advantage of consumers (i.e. 
China) to extract maximum price premium.48 Yet China’s surging leverage might be even superior in 
future gas negotiations due to multiple options. Whereas Russia would never be able to formulate a gas 
export policy that does not include China as the biggest market in Asia, China would have no problem 
satisfying its growing gas demand without any supply from Russia, at least until around 2030 (Itoh 
2017). Since the start of the Ukraine crisis Russia’s economic and diplomatic position has taken a turn 
for the worse. It must sort out an economy that has become overly dependent on commodities and now 
has an overstretched military sector.49 The oil price is unlikely to recover to the level that Russia once 
considered essential for its economy. And for the time being, not only does Beijing consider Russia to 
be a particularly risky country in which to invest,50 but it is not preoccupied with securing gas supplies 
from Russia’s Eastern regions because of plentiful alternatives and the awareness that Russian gas in 
the East is reliant on the vast Chinese market. 
Several years of recession, alienation from Europe, open antagonism with the United States, and few 
options available except a turn to the East has made concluding the energy partnership a higher priority 
for Moscow than it will ever be for China. If economic influences were acting alone, Moscow’s 
diplomatic effort would naturally be focused on persuading the EU to restore economic relations. Yet, 
due to Russia’s distinctive value-system and its aspirations of again being treated as a great power 




During the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on 9 May 2015, Chinese troops marched across Red 
Square, a compelling sign of the depth and breadth of the Sino-Russian partnership. The nexus of 
economics, security, and subjective interpretations of self-interested behaviour in Sino-Russian energy 
relations, however, demands greater attention by students of IPE. This article constitutes a modest step 
in that direction. It sheds light on the evolving character of a relationship whose significance for area 
specialists, energy scholars, and students of international political economy has grown dramatically 
over the past ten years. 
It adds to ongoing theoretical debates in IPE by identifying new causal pathways through which 
changing domestic narratives can influence the goals and content of a state’s strategy. Additional 
research on this issue is sorely needed and should help identify the boundaries and limits of rationalist 
claims. To use Abdelal’s convincing formulation (2009, 72), in contrast to rationalist approaches to 
IPE, which tend to assume that market participants, policy markets, and even whole societies 
unproblematically recognize the material incentives around them and act accordingly, this article argues 
that none of this is inevitable or inexorable. Recent work on how identity concerns affect the IPE of 
Eurasian energy relations may prove useful in this regards (Belyi and Talus 2015; Shaw 2012). 
Gas is being increasingly depoliticized and turned into a globally traded commodity and is 
concurrently shifting to a system of floating prices and spot deals. Several implications relevant for the 
evolving character of Sino-Russian energy relations follow from these arguments: over the past decade, 
gas trade has transcended regional borders and gas market regulations have followed in lockstep. 
However, regional and national specificities are still very important features and illustrate the variety 
of reactions to the globalization of gas markets. As the different commercial experiences of Rosneft 
and Gazprom towards China indicate, economic complementarity (present both in oil and gas) cannot 
explain the different trajectories of Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation. Individual personalities (such 
as that of Igor Sechin), histories, memories, biases, and prejudices that firms and individuals bring to 
the negotiating table do matter. So does the restraining role played by public policy (i.e. the European 
Commission), thus highlighting the growing limitations of the use of gas as a diplomatic tool. The 
strategic importance of commodities varies from nation to nation and over time. 
During the past decade, a burgeoning empirical literature has emerged on the Sino-Russian energy 
relationship. However, existing studies still tend to focus on whether the Sino-Russian deals are 
commercially sound and just how uneconomical they might be for Russia. But this prevailing wisdom 
tell us nothing about why deals happen at particular time periods in the first place. The answer to why 
now for the 2014 gas deal, I propose, lies in the focus on domestic national preference formation. For 
Russia it was about perceptions of an increasingly grim EU-Russian gas trade in the face of regulations 
penalizing Gazprom’s operations in Europe and a landmark antitrust investigation by authorities in 
Brussels. It was the open conflict with Europe, which has battered corporate earnings and national 
coffers, that acted as a significant step towards shelving disputes and pursuing Sino-Russian gas trade. 
The shift was legitimated by a changing narrative in the Kremlin; the rise of Eurasianists and their 
civilizational push to the East. Although Putin’s approach today is definitely closest to realist thinking, 
it is hard to apply realism for explaining Russia’s shift. Realists expect that policy change follow 
evolution in a state’s relative economic capabilities. Yet in 2014 Russia’s capabilities did not improve. 
A nationalist coalition coalesced around a domestic discourse perceiving the West as seeking to 
internally weaken Russia and attempting to limit Moscow’s influence in the former Soviet region. This 
change in domestic thinking resulted in a more aggressive domestic narrative and signalled a major 
shift in foreign policy. For China, too, greater emphasis on identity-based politics, such as its tailoring 
an “environmentally responsible power” image as well as its heightened perception of the “Malacca 
Dilemma” – provide better answers for why reconciling differences with Russia was seen as vital at 
that precise moment. This study contends that whether and when economic interdependence promotes 
(or inhibits) cooperation across borders depends on the interaction among material influences, domestic 
narratives, and the subjective interpretations of self-interested behaviour among key actors. The core 
finding is notable because while domestic coalitions have been shown to influence domestic and 
national economic policy, their ability to directly shape foreign economic cooperation has been much 
less clear. In summary, this study advances the literature on domestic and national identity explanations 
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